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Back haul problems occur in many areas of transportation. One-way rental often takes equip-
ment, such as cases and containers, from an area of high demand to an area of low demand. 
The problem is to return the equipment to the location of need, a problem typically viewed 
as an admimstrative and scheduling problem. We developed a decentrali7cd approach in 
which a specially designed market organizes competition and information to minimize the 
cost of back-hauls without the direct intervention of administrative negotiations or comm,md-
and-control types of scheduling. We employed laboratory experimental methods to test the 
concept, examine its performance against thcorellcal benchmarks, and explore its limitations. 
(Trn11sportntion: costs. Games/group decisions: bidding/auctions.) 
T he back-haul problem is well known to manage-ment in many areas of transportation. The prob-
lem occurs when using equipment causes its reloca-
tion, and it must be relocated before it can be used 
again. Getting the equipment back to where it is 
needed is costly. For example, a customer who rents 
an international freight container or a moving truck 
may return it at a distant location. The owner may be 
able to rent it to another customer at its new location. 
! Iowever, if no current demand exists at the return lo-
cation, the owner may need to back-haul rental units 
to a location that ha'3 sufficient demand. Naturally oc-
curring patterns of trade can create situations in which 
back-haul is common. 
When the owner of the rental units is also the owner 
of the least-cost transportation, the back-haul problem 
is merely one of optimization by a single agent. How-
ever, if the owner of the rental units must contract for 
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the transportation from a number of providers, the 
owner must try to attain a least-cost outcome. Classi-
cally, analysts consider the problem from the point of 
view of uncertainties and the complexities of sched-
uling. They consider the problem from the point of 
view of a single decision maker who formulates the 
problem on the best information avmlable and makes 
a decision. By contrast we outline a process for making 
such decisions whose heart is a new, decentralized, 
smart auction process. Here the problem include<; the 
complexity of asymmetric information in that only the 
transportation providers know the costs. 
The competition and self-selection features of auc-
tions provide practical advantages. The term smart auc-
tion refers to an auction in which a computer solves the 
complex combinatorial problem implicit in back-haul 
problems and reports the potential winning bidders. 
We tested the feasibility of the idea by applying new 
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experimental techniques found in laboratory experi-
mental economics. 
The problem has two central features. First, the 
equipment owner might achieve the most efficient 
back-haul through some combination of several differ-
ent transportation providers, each of which moves 
only part of the stock to be moved. Second, the firm 
that wants to procure the back-haul services does not 
know the providers' costs. The first feature implies that 
the cost-minimizing allocation will require some com-
bination of appropriately coordinated service provid-
ers. The second feature implies that the equipment 
owner must use some form of competition to minimize 
costs. The use of smart-market competition in this con-
text is new. For previous smart-market designs, see 
Rassenti et al. (1982), McCabe et al. (1987), Banks et al. 
(1989), Olson and Porter (1994), Brewer and Plott 
(1996), as well as Plott and Porter (1996), and Brewer 
(1999) for other examples of combinatorial auctions. 
We designed a smart market to solve these two prob-
lems in the back-haul environment, in addition to 
other problems that surface in environments in which 
a competitive equilibrium does not exist. 
Intuitively the process will operate through iterative 
periods of competition in which competing sellers will 
adjust their services and charges to fit into a least-cost 
combination of transportation charges when meshed 
with the buyer's cost-savings information. The buyer 
(rental company) posts a cost function giving the costs 
it faces if the equipment is not moved. These costs are 
a sum of storage costs at sink locations and opportu-
nity costs for missed rentals at source locations. The 
sellers (transportation providers) then participate in a 
continuous iterative bidding process that resembles a 
first-price procurement auction. Sellers determine and 
post asking prices for moving units, which depend on 
their costs of transportation along particular routes. A 
computer evaluates these offers in light of the buyer's 
cost function and announces a set of potential winners 
and losers. The process continues until no seller wishes 
to ask a lower price for its transportation services. At 
that point, the potential allocation becomes the actual 
allocation, and sellers collect on their transportation 
contracts. 
We considered three fundamental questions. First, 
how can we formally represent the process? Since this 
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is not an auction of the usual sort, its dimensions must 
be made clear. Second, how can we define the process 
in operational terms? Exactly what do the participants 
know, and exactly how does the auction work? Third, 
will it do what it is supposed to do? Since we test the 
auction using laboratory experimental techniques, we 
need some explanation of how to apply these tech-
niques and what we can Jearn from their application. 
Laboratory Test-Bed Methodology 
The use of labortory experimental techniques to test 
new types of processes is rapidly gaining popularity. 
The idea is to create and in1plement prototypes of the 
process in laboratory environments. Individuals mo-
tivated by financial incentives compete under condi-
tions that the experimenter controls and understands. 
Such an exercise addresses several important issues. 
First, by constructing a prototype, the experimenter 
gives a concrete and operational incarnation to the 
ideas that support the process. That is, he or she re-
places abstract concepts with real things and demon-
strates that the concepts have an internal consistency. 
Second, the experimenter can study the operations of 
the process and determine whether the process per-
formed as it was supposed to perform. It is a type of 
proof of principle. Third, the experimenter can exam-
ine design consistency, asking whether the results are 
understandable in terms of the basic principles used in 
the design of the process or if the results are due to 
lucky chance. The role of design consistency in evalu-
ating market prototypes is becoming established (Plott 
1994). A process that is to be scaled up to a business 
level should work for the right reasons; otherwise, the 
results may not survive the scaling. Finally, obtaining 
these answers from laboratory experimental methods 
is inexpensive. The experimenter will discover badly 
conceived, incompletely conceived, or internally in-
consistent processes at little cost relative to field tests. 
He or she can expose processes based on unreliable 
principles through inexpensive tests. Test beds pro-
vide a first pass at developing new methods of doing 
business. 
Plott (1994) described the basic test-bed approach to 
testing allocation mechanisms. Brewer and Plott (1996) 
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successfully applied the approach to the BICAP auc-
tion for access to railroad tracks, and Plott and Porter 
(1996) applied it to auctions for access to NASA space-
station resources. A number of additional studies gen-
erally fit the notion of the test-bed approach, even if 
the word te.st-bed docs not appear explicitly in the lan-
guage of the research. These include Grether et a!. 
( 1989), Rassenti ct al. (1982) for airport slots allocation; 
McCabe et al. (1987, 1989) for smart markets integrat-
ing the production, delivery, and transportation of gas 
and electricity; Banks eta!. (1989) for contingency plan-
ning; and Olson and Porter (1994) for 1:1 slot-
assignment problems, such as their example of assign-
ing research groups to radio-telescope slots. 
To provide some additional background on test 
beds, we will focus on two examples. Both the train-
tracks and spacc·station studies concern a shared fa-
cility, a set of specific feasibility constraints (only cer-
tain combinations of trains or projects can share the 
tracks or the station successfully), and a set of users 
whose value for using the facility varies and is not 
known to a central coordinator responsible for admin-
istering access to the facility. This particular collection 
of problem features is known as a primte values em.•t· 
ronment within the literature of the economics of mech-
anism design. 
In each case, the question was whether some partic-
ular well-defined market or auction mechanism could 
coordinate the users and their privately held infor-
mation about their values of using the facility to 
achieve a high efficiency of use for the facility. Put an 
other way, what mechanism would tend to grant ac-
cess to the users who value access the most? A body 
of economic theory existed that suggested that certain 
auction or market mechanisms could ideally yield the 
desired outcomes. Stakeholders in these facilities, how-
ever, had their own idea<; about what allocation mech-
anisms should or should not be implemented, and one 
argument always voiced against new mechanisms was 
the lack of available data. The test-bed methodology 
was one means of securing information about the vi 
ability of economic processes that had never before 
been attempted or compared. 
In the case of rail (Brewer and Plott 1996), the proof 
of principle provided by laboratory auction data from 
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a prototype auction helped to rebut arguments in Swe-
den that auction-based processes were incompatible 
with rail scheduling. Design-consistcnc:y analyses of 
the dynamics of bidding showed not only that bidding 
was efficient, but also that it was efficient for reasons 
underpinning its design (particularly the ability of the 
mechanism to take into account the opporttmity cost 
of awarding a given train route and the ability of 
agents to collaboratively bid away from certain kinds 
of bad outcomes). Because of these arguments the 
Swedes increased their study of auctions (Nilsson 
1999), as did the Dutch (Cox et al. 2002). 
In the case of the space station, Plott and Porter 
(1996) compared the performance of two markets and 
auction-based mechanisms wtth a pnority-based ad-
ministrative procedure similar to NASA's. The new 
mechanisms, within the laboratory test bed, offered 
improved utilization and efficiency of resour<.es and 
even allowed for new methods of contmgency plan-
ning as suggested by Banks et al. (1989). Design con-
sistency analyses showed that the competitive mech-
anisms functioned in accordance with the competitive 
models underpinning their design, and also that the 
administrative procedures NASA used fit the models 
as well. That is, the NASA administrative procedures 
performed poorly not by chance, but because they 
were not, in the language of the economic models, in-
centive compatible. In fact, it was to agents' advantage 
to shade the truth and to subvert the administrative 
processes in certain ways (for example, demanding 
more than they needed, expectmg to be scaled back) 
and these tactics could also be observed in operation 
in the test-bed comparisons. One result of this research 
was a decision by NASA to create a private online bar-
tering market for mission Cassini resources and to al-
low this market to largely dictate the design of the 
spacecraft. The design NASA finally used was some-
what different from the designs studted by Plott and 
Porter (1996), but the test-bed methodology clearly 
played a role in convincing NASA to attempt such a 
radically different procedure for mission design. 
More formally, test beds involve tlm.~e clements. The 
first is an environment that contains the economic pa-
rameters of a model economic problem that is to be 
solved. The back-haul problem is a type of private-
costs environment. This is similar to the private-values 
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environments of the rail and NASA studies, except that 
the private information is the costs of agents taking 
certain actions rather than agents' values of access to 
a facility. The second element is the mechanism that is 
to be implemented-the prototype auction process. 
Third is the set of criteria or performance measures by 
which the mechanism's performance is to be evalu-
ated, together with existing ideas about why the mech-
anism might perform as expected. 
In the back-haul case, we used four benchmarks to 
evaluate performance. The first is the lowest-cost pos-
sibility, which is the case of vertical integration in 
which the purchasing firm has all of the cost functions 
of all providers and nlso has the power to administer 
what they do. The second benchmark is a monopsony, 
in which the purchasing firm knows all the providers' 
costs but must use s imilar payment terms for all pro-
viders. We consider two cases, single price and nonlin-
ear pricing, for the monopsony, which chooses prices 
strategically to obtain low costs. The third is the com-
petitive model in which the derived demand from the 
firm's cost savings is in equilibrium with providers' 
marginal cost of transportation. The final benchmark 
involves sequential contracts, with the buyer meeting 
with the transportation providers in sequence and, at 
each meeting, arranging a contract that maximizes to-
tal surplus in a myopic, nonforward-looking, fashion. 
These benchmarks represent difficult challenges. Each 
assumes either that the buyer has information or pow-
ers that it does not have or that competitive or strategic 
processes can operate in a way that is a bit unusual 
when one buyer deals with only a few sellers. 
Background, Notation, and Concepts 
We will roughly define a class of transportation envi-
ronments in terms sufficient to explore the economic 
issues involved without providing too much detail. 
A transportation problem that is trivial in size ex-
emplifies the features of many transport-management 
problems (Figure 1). Two locations, A and B, have 
product to be picked up, and two locations, D and E, 
are empty and waiting for product to be delivered. The 
properties of each location can be described with three 
parameters: a capacity K, the current stock L, and the 
target level T. Capacity K and stock level L are physical 
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properties. In contrast, the desired target level T de-
pends on the economic property of a location as a 
pickup or delivery location and on local business con-
ditions (which we take to be exogenous). 
The principal's target is to have the entire stock at 
warehouses A (30 units) and B (30 units) picked up 
and delivered to the empty warehouses at locations D 
and E, which can each hold 30 units. 
Agents 
Two classes of agents operate in the environment: a ~in­
gle principal agent (denoted P) and several transportation-
provider agents (each denoted t,). A class of agents is 
defined in terms of their economic roles and the tech-
nology and information they possess. 
The principal agent P owns the goods in the ware-
houses at locations A, B, 0 , and E. The principal agent 
knows the capacities, current stock, and target levels 
at each warehouse and knows the costs of failing to 
meet target levels of units. The principal agent cannot 
move units and must contract with transportation-
provider agents to move the units. 
The transportation agents face certain costs for mov-
ing units, which vary from agent to agent and from 
Pickup Locations Delivery Locatiom 
K,•30 Routes K0 • 30 
A AD D ~ 
L~-30TA• O 
1,)- o Tn•JO 
K0 • 30 
KF• 30 
B E L::J BE 
Ln• 30 T8• 0 
L. · OT,,-30 
Figure 1: We chose this prototypical back-haul problem as our experl· 
mental test bed . There are four locations labeled A, B, 0, and E. (As C 
often designates a cost function, we avoid using lito label a location.) 
Each location has a current stock level L, a capacity K, and a target (or 
desired) level T. For example, the figure could represent a supplv of empty 
ocean-freight containers at A and B, where there is excess supplv. that 
need to be returned to 0 and E, where thev could be rented to new cus-
tomers. 
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route to route. These costs are generally private infor-
mation known only to the agents. To facilitate an ex-
p loratiOn of the general features of back-haul prob-
lems, we avoid specifying any particular functional 
forms for agents' costs. 
The Principal Agent's Management 
Problem 
The principal agent tries to solve a cost-minimization 
problem of the following form: 
Choose a transportation strategy to 
minimize 
principal's total cost = cost of moving units 
+ cost of unmoved units 
with respect to constraints: 
(1) at each pickup location, units picked up cannot 
exceed total stock of umts; 
(2) at each delivery location, units delivered cannot 
exceed warehouse capacity K; 
(3) total tmits picked up must equal total units 
delivered. 
To choose t1 transportation strategy, the principal 
agent chooses ho"" many units to move at each loca-
tion. This chotec, along with the initial stock at each 
location, determines the level of stock at each location 
The principal agent faces a trade-off behveen costs for 
moving units and costs for not meeting targets. The 
constraints upon the principal are essentially that units 
cannot be created or destroyed (total pickups cannot 
exceed <;;tack, and total pickups must equal total deliv-
eries) and that the warehouse capacities cannot be 
exceeded. 
The complexity of this problem is suggested by the 
numerous variables on which the moving costs and the 
unmoved costs might depend. Clearly, the cost of 
moving units depends on the number moved and also 
upon the details of negotiation between the principal 
and the transportation providers. 
Some initial insight into the problem can be obtained 
by separating the details of routing from the resulting 
movements. Distinguishing behveen these notions re-
sults in certain simplifications. An essential feature of 
back-haul en\-ironments seems to be that demand de-
pends only upon movements, while supply depends 
iNTERfACES 
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upon the details of routing. Understanding thi.., feature 
of back-haul environments is crucial to auction design 
and to creating theoretical performance benchmarks. 
Principal's Choices: Movements vs. 
Routing 
The principal must choose how many units to move at 
each location, specifying a movement vector or a rout 
ing vector. 
A movement vector M = (MA, M11, M0 , Mr) is a 
vector giving the net change in the number of units at 
each location. The sign shows whether the units being 
moved arc pickups or deliveries. For example, if M = 
( 20, 25, 30, 15), then 20 units are to be picked up 
at location A, 25 units are to be picked up at location 
B, 30 units arc to be delivered to location D, and 15 
units are to be delivered to location E. 
A routing vector r (r AD, r \!1 r"D' r111 ) gives the 
number of units to be moved along each route in the 
trnnsportation network. A routing vector is more spe· 
cific than a movement vector. Any particulnr move-
ment vector can be achieved by many routing vectors 
(Figure 2). 
Properties of the Test-Bed 
Environment 
We usc simple properties to summari~e this broad 
class of transportation environment based on noticing 
what components of the principal's or the transporta· 
tion provider's cost depend on moving versus routing 
vectors. 
PROPERTY 1. In tlze test-bed enviromnc11t I a target move-
ment vector can be defined as MT T - L, wlrae tire 
vectors T and L give tire target level and wrrenf stock lt'!Je/ 
at eaclr location. The target movcmr11t vector does not 
uniquely speciftJ a target routi11g vector; many routing 11L'C-
tors result in the same movement vector. 
PROPI·RTY 2. Demand in terms of willingness to pay for 
tra11sportation depends only upon tire mol'l'mmt vector. The 
principal's costs of unmoved units (not mceting targets) de-
pelld only upon the difference (MT - M) /Jctwee11 the target 
movemmt vector MT nnd the chosen mot>emcnt vector M 
PROPERTY 3. Supply costs for tran~portation dept'lld 011 
the routing vector. Ench transportation provider's costs of 
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10 >D A \() 
R.ul R.£ Reo Rae l\h • 
(ru.+ru:J 
10 10 20 s .2() 
20 0 10 IS ·20 
B 
-25 
_....:;;..::>0:;,_--+> D 
AD 
M:>" 
(ru.+r..,) 
30 
30 
Figure 2: There are many ways to achieve the target movement vector 
(- 20,- 25,30, 15). The routing vectors shown are but two possible ex· 
amples. In general, many routing vectors may yield the same net move· 
ment vector. 
moving units will depend upon tlze routing vector r, that 
provider choo~es. 
PROPERTY 4. The principal's costs of moving units de-
pend 11po11 the details of contracts between the pri11cipal and 
tht• transportation pn>Piders and the routing vector selected 
as a result of the~e ccmtracts. 
The Experimental Test Bed 
The arrangement of pickup and drop-off locations is 
the same as shown in Figure 1: 
X set of locations = {A, B, D, E}, 
XP•lk = set of pickup locations = {A, B}, and 
X drup set of drop off locations -= {D, E). 
Agent., have the same role they did in the example, 
only now we will specify the number of transportation 
agents and their cost functions for moving units. A 
principal agent P wishes to obtain transportation from 
12 transport agents t1 .•• t12. Thus 
I = set of agents = {P, t1, t2, ••. , td. 
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The Principal's Cost Parameters 
The principal's cost function is 
Cr = cmovang(M) + c~nmtl\'l'<I(MT - M), 
where MT is the target movement vector and M is the 
movement vector the princtpal agent chooses. The cost 
of moving units depends generally on prices paid to 
the transportation agents. Prices for moving the units 
will be determined in the experiments using a bidding 
mechanism. We chose the cost of unmoved units, 
C)\nmo,·t>d(MT - M), for this initial series of experi-
ments, to have the following quadratic form: 
C~nmoved(MT - M) = 41 I (MT - M) I 12 
= 4 L (T;r - L, - M,>2 . 
... x 
We chose a quadratic because it would be easy for 
experimental subjects to understand and because it has 
reasonable marginal-cost properties. (This means that 
we do not need to develop additional software for lab-
oratory subjects to explain or demonstrate the princi-
pal's cost function. If we used more complex functions 
in our test bed, such additional software tools might 
become necessary so that subjects could eastly deter-
mine the consequences of various what-if scenarios.) 
Quadratic functions are good approximations in that 
they reflect many of the complicating factors of more 
general functions. With a quadratic, the marginal cost 
of an additional unmoved unit is an increasing func-
tion of the number of unmoved units at any location. 
As more and more containers remain unmO\ed, it will 
be more expensive (at the margin) to find storage for 
them at sink locations A and B, or to find replacement 
containers (or otherwise compensate) at source loca-
tions D and E. 
The Transportation Agents' Cost 
Parameters 
Table 1 shows the cost functions of the transportation 
providers. The costs of moving units over separate 
routes are additive. For example, 1f agent 5 moves two 
units along route AD and three units along route AE, 
the cost is (45 + 180 - 225) along route AD and (144 
+ 216 + 300 = 660) along route AE, for a total cost 
of 225 + 660 = 885. 
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Margmal cost Margmal cost Marginal cost Margmal cost 
Route A to D Route A toE Route B to D Route B toE 
umt UOII unrt unit 
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 
1 9 216 225 432 192 264 276 372 132 264 396 407 72 96 216 240 
2 18 207 279 423 180 252 348 384 121 253 330 418 66 90 210 234 
3 27 198 234 414 168 240 288 396 110 242 385 429 60 84 204 228 
4 36 189 288 405 156 228 360 408 99 231 319 440 54 78 198 222 
5 45 180 243 396 144 216 300 420 88 220 374 451 6 30 150 174 
6 54 171 297 387 12 132 204 432 77 209 308 462 12 36 156 180 
7 63 162 252 378 120 312 444 576 66 198 363 473 18 42 162 186 
8 72 153 306 369 24 108 456 564 55 187 297 484 24 48 168 192 
9 81 144 261 360 96 324 468 552 44 176 352 495 102 126 246 270 
10 90 135 315 351 36 84 480 540 33 165 286 506 108 132 252 276 
11 99 126 270 342 72 336 492 528 22 154 341 517 114 138 258 282 
12 108 117 324 333 48 60 504 516 11 143 275 528 120 144 264 288 
Table 1: The table shows the marginal costs of movement In the experimental test bed. Each row shows the 
marginal cost functions of one particular agent. For example, the cost to agent 5 to move the lirst unit from A 
to E Is 144; the cost to agent 5 to move the second unit on this route is 216. These cost parameters create 
special nonlinear pricing opportunities for a buyer on route AD-the total cost for moving two units Is always 
225 for each transport agent. A buyer with knowledge and willingness to exploit this feature could capture most 
of the benefits of trade by offering only a contract lor moving two units with a payment of 226. 
We chose the cost functions of the various transpor-
tation agents as unrecognizable pieces of a linear total 
supply function (Table 2). Let _[v] be the largest in-
teger less than or equal to v (that is, rounding down). 
Then the aggregate supply functions for the various 
routes arc the following: 
SAo(P AD) = _[P Ao/9] , 
SAl (P AIJ = _[P Ar/12] I 
S,m(Pso) = lPso/11] 
Sll,.(Psr.> = [Psc/61_. 
Because we give the cost functions to subjects in the 
form of a short, simple table, we could have chosen 
any functions for the mdtvidual and, hence, the aggre-
gate costs. We chose unrecognizable individual costs 
but linear aggregate costs as a means of testing the 
mechanism. Will competition in this mechanism act to 
generate linear supply? If it does, then tt does so even 
though no agent realizes this to be the case. Calculating 
some of the benchmarks was made easier in the case 
of linear supply, though we do not provide details of 
fNTtRFACES 
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these calculations. In addition, the way we distributed 
the supply functions among the transportation provid-
ers incorporates some purposefully chosen peculiari-
ties that would be useful to a buyer who can set prices 
in an ultimatum-like fashion (a monopsonist). These 
technicalities are, for the most part, beyond the scope 
of the paper but dbtinguish two of the monopsony 
benchmarks (one price vs. nonlinear pricing). 
The Combinatorial Back-Haul 
Auction Mechanism 
The following set of rules describes the combinatorial 
back-haul (CB) auction: 
(1) At each point in time, each transportation agent 
in the auction may have ex.actly one standing ask of 
the form A, (t, P, M;A, M,6 , M,0 , M,1 ), where P, is 
the price agent t, asks to remo\'e M,A units from loca-
tion A, to remove M;6 units from loc.1tion B, to deliver 
M,c_ umts to location C, and to deliver M,0 units to 
location D. 
(2) The auction starts with a null initial ask (t,, 0, 0, 
0, 0, 0) from each agent. 
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Supply from A to D Supply from A to E Supply from B to D Supply from B to E 
Unit# MC Assigned to Unit I MC Assigned to Umt# MC Asstgned to Unit# MC Assigned to 
1 9 1 1 12 6 1 11 12 1 6 5 
2 18 2 2 24 8 2 22 11 2 12 6 
3 27 3 3 36 10 3 33 10 3 18 7 
4 36 4 4 48 12 4 44 9 4 24 8 
5 45 5 5 60 12 5 55 8 5 30 5 
6 54 6 6 72 11 6 66 7 6 36 6 
7 63 7 7 84 10 7 77 6 7 42 7 
8 72 8 8 96 9 8 88 5 8 48 8 
9 81 9 9 108 8 9 99 4 9 54 4 
10 90 10 10 120 7 10 110 3 10 60 3 
11 99 11 11 132 6 11 121 2 11 66 2 
12 108 12 12 144 5 12 132 1 12 72 1 
13 117 12 13 156 4 13 143 12 13 78 4 
14 126 11 14 168 3 14 154 11 14 84 3 
15 135 10 15 180 2 15 165 10 15 90 2 
16 144 9 16 192 1 16 176 9 16 96 1 
17 153 8 17 204 6 17 187 8 17 102 9 
18 162 7 18 216 5 18 198 7 18 108 10 
19 171 6 19 228 4 19 209 6 19 114 11 
20 180 5 20 240 3 20 220 5 20 120 12 
21 189 4 21 252 2 21 231 4 21 126 9 
22 198 3 22 264 1 22 242 3 22 132 10 
23 207 2 23 276 1 23 253 2 23 138 11 
24 216 1 24 288 3 24 264 1 24 144 12 
25 225 1 25 300 5 25 275 12 25 150 5 
26 234 3 26 312 7 26 286 10 26 156 6 
27 243 5 27 324 9 27 297 8 27 162 7 
28 252 7 28 336 11 28 308 6 28 168 8 
29 261 9 29 348 2 29 319 4 29 174 5 
30 270 11 30 360 4 30 330 2 30 180 6 
31 279 2 31 372 1 31 341 11 31 186 7 
32 288 4 32 384 2 32 352 9 32 192 8 
33 297 6 33 396 3 33 363 7 33 198 4 
34 306 8 34 408 4 34 374 5 34 204 3 
35 315 10 35 420 5 35 385 3 35 210 2 
36 324 12 36 432 6 36 396 1 36 216 1 
37 333 12 37 444 7 37 407 1 37 222 4 
38 342 11 38 456 8 38 418 2 38 228 3 
39 351 10 39 468 9 39 429 3 39 234 2 
40 360 9 40 480 10 40 440 4 40 240 1 
41 369 8 41 492 11 41 451 5 41 246 9 
42 378 7 42 504 12 42 462 6 42 252 10 
43 387 6 43 516 12 43 473 7 43 258 11 
44 396 5 44 528 11 44 484 8 44 264 12 
45 405 4 45 540 10 45 495 9 45 270 9 
46 414 3 46 552 9 46 506 10 46 276 10 
47 423 2 47 564 8 47 517 11 47 282 11 
48 432 1 48 576 7 48 528 12 48 288 12 
Table 2: The table shows the economic supply functions for movement along the tour routes. These are directly 
Induced by our choice of marginal cost parameters In Table 1, which we chose as unrecognizable pieces of a 
linear supply function . It Is not obvious to our experimental subjects that a linear total supply function exists; 
one question posed by our research is whether the market somehow behaves as though it aggregates or uses 
this information. The supply slopes are different: it Is more costly to move units along AE than along BE. 
INTERFACES 
20 Vol. 32, No.5, September-October 2002 
BREWER AND PLOTT 
Bnck-Hnu/ Tmnsporlntron Problems 
(3) At each point in the auction, a computer calcu-
lates the set of asks that minimizes total costs to the 
principal agent P. This set of asks is called the potential 
allocation, and the cost to the principal agent is called 
the potential principal cost. The potential allocation 
and potential principal cost information is sent to the 
participants. 
(4) An agent ti is allowed to replace his ask Ai with 
a new ask A,* only if it does not increase the potential 
principal cost. 
(5) If T0 seconds elapse without an acceptable new 
ask from some agent, the auction concludes. The po-
tential allocation becomes the final transportation con-
tract. The principal must pay the transportation agents, 
and these agents must deliver the transportation 
services. 
A central computer oversees the rules of the pro-
curement auction. The auction operates as follows. Be-
fore the auction opens, the principal posts the cost 
function q~nmoved and the target movement vector MT 
to a public information area of the computer. When 
the auction opens, a timer is started at 60 seconds. 
Agents may submit asks consisting of a requested price 
for providing some movement vector of units. The 
computer determines whether this ask would be ten-
tatively accepted or rejected and, if not rejected, reports 
the new ask along with the potential allocation infor-
mation to all agents. At any time, agents may revise 
their asks in a manner that decreases the principal's 
cost, that is, they may offer a lower price or offer to 
move more units for the same price. A soft termination 
rule is used, similar to the going-going-gone of oral 
auctions: the auction continues until the timer expires, 
but each new ask that is included in the potential al-
location resets the timer for another 60 seconds. There-
fore, the auction ends when no agent submits a cost-
improving ask. 
The following intuition plays a role in suggesting 
this particular auction organization. From rules 1 
through 4, we see that the principal's cost function can 
be broken up into components according to whether 
movement or routing vectors are important. Details of 
routing are among the issues that determine transpor-
tation providers' costs, but only movement is relevant 
to the principal. Thus, the auction is designed to let 
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transportation providers determine the details of rout-
ing, with competition driving these providers to select 
lower-cost routings over higher-cost nlternatives. 
Through asks, the transportation providers input the 
costs of movement for a computer to compare against 
the principal's cost of not moving units. Information 
needed for transportation providers to construct po-
tentially winning asks is made available: the lower 
limit for a profitable ask is the transportation pro-
vider's minimum cost for moving units, which they 
know, while the upper limit for an ask can be deter-
mined from the competing asks and the competing al-
ternative of the principal's unmoved cost function, 
which are made public information by the rules of the 
auction. 
The soft-closure action of the timer should encour-
age competition and terminate the auction when no 
further lowering of costs is possible. (In many ways, 
the principal's unmoved cost function is like a set of 
competing asks. It is an alternative that will be adopted 
if transportation providers' asks are too high. An al-
ternative auction design might keep this information 
secret from transportation providers, instead of re-
vealing it as we have done. However, such a design 
would make it more difficult for transportation pro-
viders to submit initial asking prices. The secret un-
moved cost information would also slowly leak out, as 
each calculation of potential allocation would reveal 
something to the agents about the form of the princi-
pal's cost function.) 
Theoretical Benchmarks and 
Standards of Performance 
We derive benchmarks using standard assumptions of 
full information and optimization on the part of 
agents, and thus they represent quite a challenge for a 
mechanism that will operate in an environment in 
which agents have sparsely distributed information 
and perhaps do not fully optimize. The benchmarks 
also serve as alternative models of the operations of 
the auction. 
In order of increasing cost to the principal agent, the 
benchmarks include vertical integration (VI), nonlinear 
pricing monopsony (4P + Q), single price monopsony 
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OP), competitive equilibrium (CE), and sequential con-
tracting (SC). 
We calculate the benchmarks using brute-force op-
timization via computer (Figures 3 through 6 and Ta-
ble 3). Figure<; 3 through 6 show the costs of procuring 
transportation along the various routes, using some of 
the benchmarks shown below. Table 3 shows similar 
calculation<; for a nonlinear-monopsony-pricing model. 
In each case, these figure5 represent intermediate re-
sults that give the cost of transporting units along a 
particular route. We then obtain the benchmarks in Ta-
ble 4 by comparing the principal's total cost over every 
possible movement and routing vector. 
Vertical Integration 
Under vertical integration, the principal P controls the 
transportation agents t, and therefore pays only the 
minimum cost of any desired transportation. Because 
the transportation agents operate at zero profit, the 
marginal procurement cost curve along a particular 
route is identical to the supply function for that route. 
The vertical integration cost benchmark is unique 
among the four we will use, because it is the mathe-
matically lowest cost It is impossible to find a collec-
tion of contracts wtth lower total costs without forcing 
the transportation providers to operate at a loss. 
Monopsony 
Under monopsony, the principal P and transportation 
agents t; arc independent. The principal chooses the 
parameters of a pricing contract, and the agents decide 
whether to move 0, I, or more units under this con-
tract. We consider two types of contracts, one-price 
(1 P) and nonlinear pricing (4P + Q). 
With one-price (I P) monopsony, the principal 
chooses a price to pay per unit of transportation for 
each route, resulting in a 4-tuple of prices (PAD' P AI:.' 
PB0 , P81 ). This is called a one-price contract because 
there is no price discrimination over quantity moved 
or over individual agents. Different agents moving 
units on the same route receive the same price per unit 
moved. 
With a nonlinear pricing (4P + Q) monopsony the 
principal chooses a vector of prices to pay for various 
22 
levels of transportation along each route. The name 4P 
Q for this benchmark indicates that the principal 
may choose four prices for each route, plus a quota of 
contracts of each type to accept along that particular 
route should supply exceed the principal's needs. On 
each particular route, a principal chooses a vector P 
(P(l ), P(2), P(3), P(4)) of prices to offer for moving one, 
two, three, or four units along that route as well as a 
vector of quotas Q = (Q(l), Q(2), Q(3), Q4)) of each 
contract type. In total, the principal chooses 16 prices, 
contained in the four vectors P ADr P Au P80, Q8 r;, and 
16 quotas, contained in four vectors QA0, QAEI Qao, 
QaE· Although the principal can engage in quantity-
based price discrimination, he cannot offer different 
prices to agents on any other criteria. 
Competitive Equilibrium 
A competitive equilibrium exists at the prices shown 
in Table 4. In competitive equilibrium, the principal 
pays a single price for all units moved along a partic-
ular route. The price along a particular route is such 
that the principal'!> demand for transportation, as de-
rived from marginal cost savings, exactly equals the 
aggregate supply of transportation, as derived from 
marginal transportation costs. The equilibrium shown 
supports the least-cost allocation of contracts. The 
movements of units are identical to those in least-cost 
vertical integration. Because the principal does not 
capture the transporters' surplus, the total cost to the 
principal is much higher than in vertical integration. 
Sequential Contracting 
Under sequential contracting, the principal agent P ne-
gotiates with each transportation agent in sequence. 
That is, first P meets with t1, then P meets with t2, and 
so on. At each meeting, the two agents first consider 
route A to D, then route A to E, then route B to D, then 
route B to E. For the purposes of creating a benchmark, 
assume that each meeting results in a contract that, 
based on the information available at that moment, re-
flects the greatest possible benefits from exchange. 
(Specifically, the principal does not consider what fu-
ture contracts may be possible with the other agents, 
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Figure 3: The total and marginal costs for moving units along route AD vary under the assumptions of four 
benchmarts: VI (vertical integration), 1 P (single-price monopsony), 4P (nonlinear pricing monopsony consisting 
of separate prices for moving bundles of 1, 2, 3, and 4 units), and 4P + Q (nonlinear pricing plus a quota 
limiting how many contracts will be accepted). The cost benchmarks ordinarily satisfy VI < 4P + Q 4P < 1P 
due to the limited and decreasing ability of the buyer to exploit market structure as we move from vertical 
Integration to one-price monopsony. The odd behavior of MC lor 4P and 4P + Q is due to the special feature 
that the MC of units 1 and 2 sum to 225 for each agent along route AD. 
who have not yet been met.) Prices for transportation 
services need only satisfy voluntary participation, im-
plymg that a broad range of contract prices is possible; 
the principal could pay as little as the transportation 
provider's marginal cost or as much as his entire cost 
savings. While there is a range of possible total costs 
of moving the units under this benchmark, the number 
of units to be moved is rigidly defined. 
tial meetings. This results in much higher levels of 
movement than in any of the other benchmarks. Inef-
ficiencies occur because the princ1pal does not buy 
strictly from the lowest-cost providers. 
Under sequential contracting, because the principal 
faces a high initial marginal cost of unmoved units and 
ignores future contract possibilities in his sequential 
maximization, he buys too much transportation in ini-
INTERFACES 
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Allowing the principal to somehow renegotiate the 
initial contracts could increase efficiency and lower 
costs. This is part of what we seek to accomplish 
automatically by designing a smart auction. Thus, the 
smart auction should provide consistently lower total 
costs than the sequential contracting benchmarks even 
if it cannot attain the low costs associated with mo-
nopsony or vertical integration. 
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Figure 4: The total costs for moving units along route AE vary under the 
assumptions of the four benchmarks: VI (vertical integration), 1P (single-
price monopsony), 4P (nonlinear pricing monopsony consisting of sepa-
rate prices for moving bundles of 1, 2, 3, and 4 units). and 4P + a 
(nonlinear pricing plus a quota limiting how many contracts will be ac-
cepted). Once again we see that the cost benchmarks ordinarily satisfy VI 
... 4P + a < 4P < 1 P. Because the slope of marginal cost is higher for 
route AE than for other routes, the various benchmarks generally exhibit 
higher curvature and higher total costs. 
Experimental Procedures 
We conducted seven experiments with various param-
eters, time periods, and numbers of trades (Table 5). 
Instructions 
In each experiment, we gave subjects detailed instruc-
tions, a cost-information sheet (essentially, each agent 
sees a single row from Table 1), and forms to fill out 
to calculate their profits from any transportation con-
tracts they might be awarded. 
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Figure 5: The total costs for moving units along route 80 vary under the 
assumptions of the four benchmarks: VI (vertical integration). 1 P (single-
price monopsony), 4P (nonlinear pricing monopsony consisting of sepa-
rate prices for moving bundles of 1, 2, 3, and 4 units), and 4P + a 
(nonlinear pricing plus a quota limiting how many contracts will be ac-
cepted). Once again we see that the cost benchmarks ordinarily satisfy VI 
< 4P + a < 4P < 1P. 
Laboratory Currency 
All economic activity in the experiments takes place in 
a currency we call francs. At the end of the experiment, 
francs are converted to US dollars, and the subject is 
paid in cash in US dollars. We announce to each subject 
at the beginning of the experiment a franc to US dollar 
conversion ratio that generally yields earnings in the 
range of US $20- 50 for each subject in the experiment. 
Information about conversion rates is kept private to 
each subject. Conversion factors vary across subjects 
so that a subject with high costs still has an incentive 
to participate when he or she can do so profitably. All 
currency figures reported in the paper arc in tcmts of 
the laboratory currency. These techniques date back to 
early market experiments of the 1970s and 1980s and 
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are now standard in most induced-value market and 
auction experiments. 
Data Issues: Paper Versus Computer 
The form of the data generated in the experiment plays 
a role in determining convenient forms of initial anal-
ysis. ln the experiments, we provided the subject's 
costs for transporting units along each route on paper, 
along with extra sheets for recording revenues, costs, 
and profits from any transportation contracts awarded 
during the experiment. We checked each subject's pa-
perwork for correctness at the end of each period. The 
computerized data consists of all asks entered into the 
auction along with the final outcome. 
We chose to computerize only the auction institution 
and not the entire experiment based on a number of 
trade-offs, both between programming labor and the 
production of experimental data, and the generality of 
experiments we could perform. This led to a design in 
which the experimental data most convenient to ana-
ly7e corresponds to the principal's point of view rather 
than to the transportation agent's point of view or a 
global point of view. 
Software Issues 
We tmplemented the combinatorial back-haul auction 
as a Web-page server system compatible with Net-
scape Navtgator. The experimenter ran a Web server 
on a computer that served as the control system, and 
the subjects ran copies of Netscape Navigator on stan-
dard windows-based PCs. 
It can be difficult to use the Web to design interactive 
markets, because ordinarily Web technologies arc 
based on pull. That is, they retrieve information only 
in response to requests from users. This is a problem 
in a fast-·moving, continuous market, because users 
find it tiresome to constantly request updates to the 
information on their screens, and the experimenter 
doesn' t know what information is on each user's 
screen. Therefore, we had to overcome major problems 
to create a continuous market over the Web. 
Our software was spcetally designed to take advan-
tage of special client-pull/server-push Netscape fea-
tures that continuously updated information on the 
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Figure 6: The total costs lor moving unils along route BE vary under the 
assumptions of the lour benchmarks: VI (vertical Integration), 1P (single-
price monopsony), 4P (nonlinear pricing monopsony consisting of sepa-
rate prices for moving bundles of 1, 2, 3, and 4 units), and 4P + a 
(nonlinear pricing plus a quota limiting how many contracts will be ac-
cepted) Once again we see that the cost benchmarks ordinarily satisfy VI 
4P + a< 4P 1P. Because the slope of marginal cost is lower for 
route BE than for other routes, the various benchmarks generally exhibit 
lower curvature and lower total costs. 
subjects' screens, rather than relying on them to re-
quest updates. Two versions of the software arc worth 
distinguishing. 
We performed experiments 1 through 3 with version 
1 of the software. In this version, subjects watched 
market information and submitted new asks on sepa-
rate Web pages. While subjects were busy entering or-
ders, they could not normally see other subjects' latest 
orders. Some subjects switched back and forth between 
the two Web pages, which took time, while more com-
puter literate subjects ran two copies of the etscape 
program so that they could sec the latest orders in one 
window and enter their own orders in another. 
We performed experiments 4 through 7 with version 
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s s s s Quota Quota Quota Quota 
cost 1 unit 2 units 3 units 4 units 1 unit 2 units 3 units 4 units 1 unit 2 units 3 units 4 units 
1 10 
2 38 
3 84 
4 148 
5 230 
6 330 
7 448 
8 556 
9 674 
10 782 
11 900 
12 1,008 
13 1,126 
14 1,234 
15 1,352 
16 1,460 
17 1,578 
18 1,686 
19 1,812 
20 1,956 
21 2,118 
22 2,298 
23 2,496 
24 2,712 
25 2,938 
26 3,182 
27 3,444 
28 3,724 
29 4,022 
30 4,337 
31 4,635 
32 4,968 
33 5,337 
34 5.737 
35 6.086 
36 6,412 
37 6,775 
38 7,114 
39 7,464 
40 7,828 
41 8,166 
42 8,550 
43 8,940 
44 9,344 
45 9,786 
46 10,210 
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Table 3: This table shows the (4P + Q) monopsony benchmark outcomes along route AD , showing how a buyer 
with complete knowledge of the seller's marginal costs could create a pricing tariff using both nonlinear pricing 
and quotas and thereby obtain a total cost below the competitive and single-price monopsony outcomes. 
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Target M, 3Q-3Q-30· ·30 
PrinCipal's Total Cost = Pickups Deliveries Price per unit moved 
Cost of Movmg Units (where applicable) 
+Cost of Unmoved Umts 
Benchmark Total cost cmow4no c_ D E P•o PA£ PBD PI[ 
VI 3,374 2.574 800 A (22) 13 9 
Vert1cal B (24) 9 15 
Integration (22) (24) 
1P 5,218 3.434 1.784 A (18) 11 7 100 85 89 79 
Monopsony B (21) 8 13 
One Pnce (19) (20) 
4P +a 4,528 3.624 904 A (23) 17 6 
Monopsony B (22) 6 16 
Nonlinear P (23) (22) 
CE 5,642 4,842 800 A (22) 13 9 120 109 104 91 
Competitive to to B (24) 9 15 to to to to 
Equilibrium 5,985 5,185 (22) (24) 127 120 111 97 
sc 7.500 7,396 104 A (26) 15 11 
Sequential to to B (30) 12 18 
Contractmg 14,400 14,296 (27) (29) 
Target M, 3Q-3Q-3Q-30 
Princ1pal's Total Cost • Pickups Delivenes Price per unit moved 
Cost of Moving Units (where applicable) 
+Cost of Unmoved Umts 
Benchmark Total cost c_ c_ D E PAll PA£ PBD Pill 
VI 3,546 2,658 888 A(21) 10 11 
Vert1cal 8(25) 6 19 
Integration (16) (30) 
1P 5,493 3,397 2,096 A(17) 8 9 73 109 56 97 
Monopsony 8(21) 5 16 
One Price (13) (25) 
4P +a 4,932 3,612 1,320 A(21) 12 9 
Monopsony 8(22) 4 18 
Nonlinear P (16) (27) 
CE 6,019 5.131 888 A(21) 10 11 96 144 67 115 
Competitive to to 8(25) 6 19 to to to 
EQUilibrium 6,239 5,351 (16) (30) 100 78 121 
sc 7,391 7,311 80 A (27) 11 16 
Sequential to to B (29) 8 21 
Contractmg 15.200 15,120 (19) (37) 
Table 4: We obtained the theoretical benchmarks for the test-bed environment by comparing the principal's 
total cost over every possible movement and routing vector. The first line of the table can be read as follows: 
for vertical Integration, the principal will face a total cost C, of 3,374 consisting of a cost of 2,574 for moving 
units and a cost of 800 lor unmoved units. This least cost Is achieved when 22 units are picked up from A, and 
of these , 13 are delivered to 0 and nine to E: and 24 units are picked up from B with nine of these delivered to 
0 and 15 to E. The totals delivered are shown In parentheses, for example, lor VI , a total of (22) units will be 
delivered to 0 and (24) delivered to E. Since the principal does not pay a constant price to the agents under 
vertical Integration, we do not report a price per unit moved. However, for the 1P and CE benchmarks, we report 
the relevant constant prices. 
IN I ERJ•AC:ES 
Vol. 32, No. 5, September- October 2002 27 
BREWER AND PLOTT 
Rack·! Iaiii TralhJl(lr/a/1!111 Problems 
Penod 1 Penod 2 Penod 3 Penod 4 Penod 5 
M, = (30.30,30.30) M, = (30.30,30,30) M, = (30,30,30,30) M, • (30.30,20,40) M, .. (30,30,20,40) 
Experiment Date/ T1me Penods T1me (sec) Asks Time (sec) Asks T1me (sec) Asks Time (sec) Asks T1me (sec) Asks 
960921 5 597 96 464 94 473 97 479 97 475 104 
12 noon 
2 960921 5 680 116 599 143 583 129 602 131 594 137 
5 pm 
3 960921 3 1,913 301 362 88 329 44 
8pm 
4 961130 5 938 127 818 116 1,031 134 670 113 1,759 285 
5pm 
5 961201 5 1,447 164 841 104 832 90 1,836 249 1,793 205 
4 pm 
6 970111 4 1,300 231 1,509 252 2.553 456 2.228 405 
1 pm 
7 970111 4 2,865 580 2.309 386 2.109 386 1,942 404 
8pm 
Table 5 This table shows the experimental periods, their duration, and the levels of observed activity. The 
greater level of activity In later experiments is due to a minor software change: the first version of the software 
required users to change from a data screen to an order screen; the second version had an lntearated data and 
order screen. While one might expect that Improved order flow would cause the auction to terminate earlier, 
this was not the case: providing a better user Interface Increased both the order flow and the duration of the 
experiment. 
2 of the software. This version merged the various Web 
pages by using the frames feature of Netscape. Subjects 
could watch the activity and place new orders without 
switching Web pages or othenvise manipulating the 
computer. 
This minor software change made a dramatic change 
in order flow and length of periods. Asks increased by 
a factor of two to three (Table 5) but did not cause the 
auction to end sooner. 
Experimental Results 
We compared the raw data for the experiments (Table 
6) to the theoretical benchmarks (Table 4) in three ar-
eas: principal's total cost, the relationship between 
mo\ mg costs and unmoved costs, and the flow of 
units Our goal was not to falsify any of the bench-
marks a<; models but simply to use them as reference 
points in evaluating the total costs observed in the ex-
periments. In addition, we expect that the details of 
movement or routing in the benchmarks may further 
our understanding of the observed outcomes in the 
combinatorial back-haul auction experiments. 
28 
Result 1. The total costs of procurement in the com-
binatorial back-haul auction tend to be (1.1) below the 
sequential contracting benchmark, (1.2) within 10 per-
cent of the competitive benchmark, and (1.3) generally 
greater than the monopsony benchmarks and therefore 
greater than the minimum possible cost (Figure 7). 
Support. (1.1) Only three of 31 periods (10 percent) 
are above the lower range of the sequential contracting 
(SC) benchmark in costs. These three occur under the 
30-30-30-30 target (SC benchmark cost: 7,500- 14,..!00) 
and are Experiment 1, Period 2 (total cost: 7,860), Ex-
periment 3, Period 3 (total cost: 7,883) and Experiment 
4, Period 1 (total cost: 8,294). For all other cases the 
total cost is lower than the SC benchmark. (1.2) For the 
30-30-30-30 target, of the 21 experiment-period obser-
vations, three are stnctly within the CE band of 5,642-
5,985, and 15 observatwns are within 10 percent of the 
CE band (5,078-6,583). For the 30-30-20-40 target, of 
the 10 total obsenrations, only one is strictly within the 
CE band of 6,019 to 6,239, and seven are within 10 
percent of the CE band (5,417 to 6,862). If the data are 
pooled across both target levels, 22 of 31 periods (71 
lN li>RFACES 
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Target (30,30,30,30) PICkups Deliveries 
Experiment Period Total cost Moving cost Unmoved cost Umts moved M~ Ma Mo M~ 
7,349 5,325 2,024 39 16 23 15 24 
2 7,860 6,100 1,760 40 16 24 18 22 
3 7,277 5,781 1,496 41 20 21 18 23 
2 6,392 4,928 1,464 41 19 22 21 20 
2 6,297 5,169 1,128 44 19 25 20 24 
3 6,427 4,883 1,544 41 17 24 20 21 
3 1 5,708 4,884 824 47 20 27 21 26 
2 7,093 5,453 1,640 40 19 21 18 22 
3 7,883 6,051 1,832 39 17 22 18 21 
4 1 8,294 5,430 2,864 34 13 21 15 19 
2 6,005 4,797 1,208 43 21 22 19 24 
3 6,088 5,240 848 46 21 25 21 25 
5 1 5,501 4,885 616 48 22 26 23 25 
2 6,107 5,203 904 45 22 23 22 23 
3 6,016 4,912 1,104 44 19 25 21 23 
6 1 5,942 4,974 968 45 20 25 21 24 
2 5,126 4,510 616 48 22 26 23 25 
3 5,976 5,112 864 46 20 26 22 24 
7 1 5,171 4,235 936 45 21 24 21 24 
2 6,186 5,218 968 45 21 24 20 25 
3 6,114 5,162 952 45 20 25 23 22 
Target (30,30,20.40) Pickups Deliveries 
Expenment Period Total cost Moving cost Unmoved cost Units moved MA Me Mo M~ 
4 7,262 5,174 2,088 39 15 24 14 25 
5 7,046 5,750 1,296 44 19 25 17 27 
3 4 6,812 5,588 1,224 44 18 26 15 29 
5 6,721 5,625 1,096 47 19 26 16 29 
4 4 7,220 5,804 1,416 43 18 25 16 27 
5 5,436 4,396 1,040 46 19 27 17 29 
5 4 6,224 5,448 776 48 21 27 18 30 
5 5,831 5,055 776 48 21 27 18 30 
6 4 6,049 5,313 736 48 22 26 18 30 
7 4 5,651 4,875 776 48 21 27 18 30 
Table 6: We broke up the raw data produced by the experiments Into two sections according to the demand 
target movement vector in the test bed. Each row corresponds to the final outcome of a specific experimental 
period. (The routing of units is unobservable in the mechanism and is not reported. Thus, the table lacks the 
routing detail shown in Table 4.) 
percent) have principal's final costs within 10 percent Period 1 (total cost: 5,171) are below the lP monopsony 
of the CE outcome, with the other nine (29 percent) benchmark. In the 30-30-20-40 environment, the IP 
having costs greater than 10 percent above the CE monopsony benchmark is a total cost of 5,493. Of the 
range. (1.3) In the 30-30-30-30 environment, the lP mo- 10 observations, only one, Experiment 4, Period 5 (total 
nopsony benchmark is a total cost of 5,218. Of the 21 cost: 5,436) is below the 1P monopsony benchmark. 
observations for target 30-30-30-30, only two (Experi- None of the experimental observations are below the 
ment 6, Period 2 (total cost: 5,126) and Experiment 7, 4P + Q monopsony benchmark. 
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Figure 7A: Figure 7(A, B) compares the principal's total costs observed in the experiments with lour theoretical 
benchmarks: competitive equilibrium (CE), monopsony (1 P, 4P + Q) , and vertical Integration (VI). Figure 7A 
shows the experimental periods with target movements M, = (30,30,30,30). Figure 78 shows the experimental 
periods with target movements M,= (30,30,20,40). Note that the observed costs generally exceed the monopsony 
benchmarks. Costs are often closest to the CE benchmark but only occasionally fall into the exact range predicted 
by aCE model. 
Result 2. The cost of moving units (awarded pro-
curement contracts) versus the cost of unmoved units 
at the end of each experimental period tended to be 
most similar to the competitive benchmark. 
cost for unmoved units while manipulating the con-
tract prices to achieve lowered moving costs (Figure 8, 
Tables 4 and 6). In general, the total cost of the moving 
contracts tends to be near the CE benchmark with a 
higher cost for unmoved units moved than would be 
expected a t the CE. With one exception (Experiment 4 
Period 1), the cost trade-off data is not at all consistent 
Support. The lP and 4P + Q monopsony bench-
marks tend to decrease total costs by bearing a higher 
30 
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with any of the monopsony or vertical integration 
benchmarks. The costs of the SC benchmark are too 
high to describe any of the observed data and off the 
scale of Figure 8. Therefore, the best candidate is the 
competitive benchmark. 
Result 3. Flows of units in the combinatorial back-
haul auction were closer to the competitive/VI bench-
mark (30-30-30-30 case) than to any monopsony 
benchmark. 
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Support. Table 7 compares the experimental obser-
vation of the movement vector and the theoretical 
benchmark movement vector using the Euclidean 
norm: 
dist 2, 
XE(A,B,D,E) 
At each target level, the CE benchmark and the VI 
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Figure BA: Figure 8 (A, B) examines the trade·olfs achieved between the costs of moving units and the costs 
of unmoved units. Figure BA shows the experimental periods with target movements M1 = (30,30,30,30). Figure 
88 shows the experimental periods with target movements Mr= (30,30,20,40). Each laboratory period produces 
a single diamond on the chart. Circles show the theoretical benchmarks: in comparison with the CE benchmark, 
the monopsony benchmarks (1P, 4P + 0) can be seen to accept a higher cost of unmoved units to produce 
greater cost reductions in the cost of moving units. We see that the trade-off achieved in the laboratory auctions 
(diamonds) is closer to the CE benchmark than to any of the monopsony benchmarks. The auction appears to 
coordinate the system towards a CE outcome, not a monopsony outcome. 
benchmarks agreed best with the experimental obser-
vations regarding the flow of units in two ways: (1) 
averaged over all periods, the distance between the ac-
tual observations and the CE and VI benchmarks is 
lower than the distance between observations and the 
monopsony benchmarks, (2) counting periods, the CE 
and VI benchmarks are closer than the other bench-
marks to predicting the outcome in 13 of the 21 30-30-
32 
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30-30 target periods and seven of 10 30-30-20-40 target 
periods for a total of 20 of the 31 periods (64 percent). 
Recall that the CE benchmark and the VI benchmark 
both predict that the movement of units will corre-
spond to an efficient movement of units. Thus the 
flows of w1its in these benchmarks are identical even 
though the costs to the principal vary. 
INTERFACES 
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c.,.t or Moving 
Unit. 
Conclusions 
We constructed a computerized procurement auction 
capable of handling back-haul and similar problems in 
the transportation of homogeneous goods when infor-
mation about seller costs is limited and the number of 
competing sellers is limited. We developed a test bed 
to provide an initial challenge that any process for 
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Observed Distance from theoretical benchmarks 
Pickups Deliveries (Euclidean norm) 
Expenment Penod M. M, Mo Me CENI 1P 4P + 0 
M •. M1,M0,M< M •. M8,M0,M, M •. M8.M0,Me 
22.24,22.24 18.21,19.20 23.22.23.22 
1 16 23 15 24 9.27 6.32 10.86 
2 16 24 18 22 7.48 4.24 8.83 
3 20 21 18 23 5.48 3.74 6.00 
2 1 19 22 21 20 5.48 2.45 4.90 
2 19 25 20 24 3.74 5.83 6.16 
3 17 24 20 21 6.16 3.46 7.07 
3 1 20 27 21 26 4.24 8.94 7.35 
2 19 21 18 22 6.16 2.45 6.48 
3 17 22 18 21 7.35 2.00 7.87 
4 13 21 15 19 12.81 6.48 13.19 
2 21 22 19 24 3.74 5.10 4.90 
3 21 25 21 25 2.00 7.35 5.10 
5 1 22 26 23 25 2.45 9.06 5.10 
2 22 23 22 23 1.41 6.16 2.00 
3 19 25 21 23 3.46 5.48 5.48 
6 20 25 21 24 2.45 6.32 5.10 
2 22 26 23 25 2.45 906 5.10 
3 20 26 22 24 2.83 7.35 5.48 
7 1 21 24 21 24 1.41 6.16 4.00 
2 21 24 20 25 2.45 6.63 5.10 
3 20 25 23 22 3.16 6.32 424 
Average distance from benchmarks 4.57 5.76 6.21 
Table 7A: Comparison of theoretical movement benchmarks (Table 4) with experimental observations for the 
periods Involving the 30·30·30·30 target (Table 6) reveals that the final aggregate movements (as measured by 
movement vectors) are closer to the CENI benchmarks than to the others. 
making back-haul decisions must solve. We designed 
and tested an auction using laboratory experiments 
with cash-motivated subjects. We compared outcomes 
to theoretical benchmarks from both competitive and 
monopsony theory with a perfectly informed buyer. 
The initial results are clear. Such an auction can be 
constructed and successfully implemented. Our auc-
tion system produ~ed costs to the principal that were 
much lower than it would obtain if its agent performed 
the functions in-house. Even though the principal's in-
house costs were known by the bidders, the auction 
resulted in lower cost. 
The costs of back-haul produced by the auction were 
lower than the negotiated-price benchmark. The back-
haul costs to the principal were roughly comparable to 
those it would have obtained if the back-haul services 
34 
had been provided in a series of competitive markets 
in which prices were equal to the marginal cost of the 
service. This is remarkable since no such m.ukets 
existed. 
The auction system did not perform as well as a per-
fectly informed monopsonist, who could use buying 
power strategically to influence prices. The combina-
tion of perfect information and buying power would 
require a very special set of circumstances; such a firm 
would have no need to consider any form of procure-
ment other than price setting. Nevertheless, the all-
knowing-monopsonist measure is an objective yard-
stick against which we can measure the performance 
of a less-informed and less-powerful purchaser. 
The auction would not perform as well as ;m intl .. '-
gratcd firm that owns all suppliers, is fully informed 
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Observed Distance from theoretical benchmarks 
Pickups Delivenes (Euclidean norm) 
Expenment Period M. Me Mo M£ CENI 1P 4P +a 
M •• M8.M0,ME M4,M8,M0,ME M •. M8.M0,ME 
21,25,16,30 17,21,13.25 21,22,16,27 
4 15 24 14 25 8.12 3.74 693 
5 19 25 17 27 3.74 6.32 3.74 
2 4 18 26 15 29 3.46 6.78 5.48 
5 19 26 16 29 2.45 7.35 4.90 
4 4 18 25 16 27 4.24 5.48 4.24 
5 19 27 17 29 3.16 8.49 5.83 
5 4 21 27 18 30 2.83 10.10 6.16 
5 21 27 18 30 2.83 10.10 6.16 
6 4 22 26 18 30 2.45 10.00 5.48 
7 4 21 27 18 30 2.83 10.10 616 
Average d1stance from benchmarks 3.61 7.85 5 51 
Table 78: Comparison of theoretical movement benchmarks with experimental observations for the periods 
Involving the 3D-3D-2D-40 target reveals that the final aggregate movements (as measured by movement vec-
tors) are, once again, closer to the CEJVI benchmarks than to the other benchmarks. 
about illl costs, ilnd provides itself with the services ilt 
the lowest possible cost. Such a buyer would be even 
more powerful than the perfectly informed monopso 
nist unless the monopsonist was able to implement 
perfect price discnmmiltlon. This measure reflects the 
best any procurement system could do, so it is a nat-
ural yardstick to apply. 
Results 2 ilnd 3 show that the way to understand 
tlus form of bilck-haul auction is by applying the com-
petitive model. rn terms of our test-bed methodology, 
these results demonstrate the consistency of the de· 
sign. Not only did the auction work, but it worked for 
reasons that underlie its design. Under competitive 
conditwns, the purchasing firm obtains its transpor· 
tiltion needs at prices equal to the marginal cost of the 
suppliers. It is remarkable that the auction performs as 
predicted by the competitive model given the substan-
tial latitude for striltegic behavior, poor coordination, 
and missed opportunities. From the point of view of 
potential users, the results suggest that the competitive 
model is the ilppropriilte benchmark. If analysis sug-
gests that orgilnized competition would reduce its 
costs, a purchasing firm should consider replacing its 
current procurement method with this form of auction. 
Future anulysts should take into consideratiOn the 
dynilmics of the process. We were primarily concerned 
Jro.n.RJACIS 
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with the outcomes at the end period-; r,1ther than with 
the process of achieving the outcomes. Details of the 
dynamics may yield insights into how to <~Iter the pro-
cess. For example, an analysis of the bidding process 
might show a tendency towards cert<~in kinds of one-
stage Nash equilibrium as Brewer and Plott (1996) re-
ported for the BICAP auction. An<~lysts could also ex-
plore aspects of procurement we did not study, such 
as quality of service, reliability, and timing. 
Finally, we offer three general observations for those 
unfamiliar with experimental economics or its enwrg-
ing test-bed methodology: (1) The emerging comput-
ing and Internet infrastructure allows business to cre-
ate new economic tools and processes for lowering cost 
or enhancing value that are more strongly tied to mar-
ket or auction-like processes. (2) The test bed meth-
odology provides a means of building <~nd testing pro-
totypes under controlled laboratory conditions that 
include monetary incent1ves. A process or mechanism 
that performs poorly can be identified at little cost. If 
a process or mechanism performs well, the analyst 
should establish whether it performs for reusons con-
sistent with the theories or models underpinning its 
design to establish principles that can yield insight into 
questions of scope or scale. (3) A broild range of prob-
lems can be solved. For example, the method we de-
35 
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scribed would apply not only to back-haul, but to any 
transportation of identical goods. The methodology of 
test beds can be applied to virtually any economic en-
vironment that can be replicated with only a few dozen 
interacting agents. 
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